Doctrinal Problems

Most can easily identify areas where better or more equipment should be provided but, the operational doctrine and organisation of the army is a much more contentious subject. However, getting this fit for purpose is just as important as getting the right tools.


Breadth, but little depth

The British army is experiencing the classic problem of a peace time army finding itself in a protracted conflict. It has strength in breadth but not in depth. In other words, it can perform a wide variety of tasks well but, it cannot sustain those tasks over indefinite periods. Lean peace time armies have little capacity for attrition, be it human (psychological or physical) or material, yet this is inevitable over time.

One major problem is a shortage of manpower. It defies logic that twenty years ago, with no overseas wars to fight the British armed forces were considerably larger than they are today. The infantry, on whom a great burden of operations is falling, is particularly under strength, but it is acute elsewhere too. This shortage in turn contributes to a calamitous choice of strategy and tactics.

Manpower shortages as a cause of poor doctrine

Let’s elaborate briefly on a tactical consequence of this manpower shortage. In both Iraq and Afghanistan coalition forces have employed a ‘search, destroy and return to base’ method, in many ways similar to US strategy in Vietnam.

For the British, covering large areas with few troops, but with firepower and skill enough to destroy any enemy encountered, it was perhaps an inevitable tactical choice. But fit for a ‘nation building’ it is not.

Whilst troops have been successful at destroying the enemy when found, they have then withdrawn to base or continued the chase and once again surrendered the area to the enemy. The consequence of this cannot be overstated. An insurgent force relies upon support from civilians, coerced or given, to function. Insurgents need access to population centres for logistical support, manpower and to achieve their political objectives. Yet how can civilians openly shun insurgents when their presence is more consistent than the coalitions. No successful counter insurgency or occupation has ever been conducted without depriving the enemy this freedom of access and nor will it. We must have the capacity to provide security as well as conduct fluid combat operations, otherwise civilians will be forced to at least cooperate with the enemy, even if only for the purposes of survival. We can only succeed in denying this access if we are more visible in the community than the insurgents.

The politically unpalatable answer is that more troops must be deployed, not just for search and destroy operations but, also for security and occupation duties. They must be based within communities to provide permenant, visible accessable and reliable security.

It is not enough to rely on allies to provide the extra manpower since we cannot always count on having them as Iraq has shown. The extent on which Territorials have been used is an admission that the MoD knows the required capacity is not present in the regular army. This continued reliance on the TA over such a long time frame, is also a sign of bad planning since if requirements are recognised as long term, they should be built into the regular establishment where they can be better manged and utilised.

But we cannot ask the regular army, in its present shape ands size to do more than it is. The strain of so many tours on so few is bad for morale and morally unacceptable. Therfore, the only real answer is an expansion to thenumbers if the regular army.

There are many other issues relating to organisation, strategy and tactics which need to be explored (unit structures and integration of arms etc) and I will post again at a later date. For now I hope we have enough to get the debate started and welcome your views.